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Abstract
When remembering past choices, people tend to attribute positive features to chosen options and
negative features to rejected options. The present experiments reveal the important role beliefs
play in memory reconstruction of choices. In Experiment 1, participants who misremembered
which option they chose favored their believed choice in their memory attributions more than
their actual choice. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants' beliefs by either "reminding"
participants they chose an option they actually rejected or providing a correct reminder.
Participants' memory attributions favored the option they believed they chose, both when that
belief was correct and when it was erroneous. Furthermore, features attributed in a fashion
favoring believed choices were more vividly remembered than features attributed in a non
choice-supportive fashion. Thus beliefs at the time of retrieval about a choice lead to memory
biases about both the valence and the vividness of remembered choice option features.

Key words: source memory; memory errors; memory for choices
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Memory Attributions for Choices: How Beliefs Shape Our Memories
Goals and beliefs at the time of memory retrieval often have a powerful influence on the
way that memories are reconstructed. For example, convincing people to believe that frequent
tooth brushing is harmful rather than beneficial leads them to recall brushing their teeth less
often in the past few weeks (Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981), and convincing people to
believe that extroversion is superior or inferior to introversion affects how many extroverted
behaviors they recall engaging in (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990).
An important part of reconstructing events is attributing information to its appropriate
source (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). For instance, was it Paul or Sue who told that
joke? Did I actually lock the door or only imagine doing it? Beliefs about the possible sources
of what one remembers can affect the attributions made about those memories (e.g., Marsh,
Cook, & Hicks, 2006; Mather, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1999; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999;
Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). For instance, knowing that someone is Republican makes people more
likely to attribute conservative-sounding statements to that person than to other potential sources
(Mather et al., 1999). Beliefs about how positive or negative a particular source is can also
influence source attributions. After people read a list of positive and negative behaviors engaged
in by two men, those who learned that Geoff is a college professor, happy, married, and
employed whereas Mark is a blue-collar employee, unhappy, divorced, and temporarily out of
work were more likely later to attribute the positive behaviors on the list to Geoff and the
negative behaviors to Mark (Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2003). Wishful thinking can also play a role
in memory attributions. Participants who read a series of predictions by psychics and learn that
one psychic is more often right in her predictions than the other psychic tend to attribute
predictions with desirable outcomes to the accurate psychic and predictions with undesirable
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outcomes to the inaccurate psychic (Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005). Furthermore, previous
studies have shown that beliefs can influence source attributions even when the information
about the sources is presented after initial encoding, and so the influence of beliefs extends
beyond just directing attention when first learning information (Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, &
Yang, 2000; Cook et al., 2003; Hicks & Cockman, 2003). Such work is consistent with the large
body of studies showing that post-event information can impact the accuracy of what one
remembers (e.g., Lane, Mather, Villa, & Morita, 2001; Pizarro, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2006;
Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996).
The present studies seek to examine the extent to which beliefs can influence memory
attributions about past choices. The objective of a choice generally is to pick the best option.
Thus, after making a choice, you are likely to harbor the belief that the chosen option was better
than the options you rejected. Motivation may also play a role in this process, as remembering
the option that you chose as being the best option should help reduce regret about your choice.
Indeed, several recent studies have shown that people tend to remember in ways that favor an
option they had chosen over an option they had rejected. Specifically, when participants selected
which of two options they would choose (e.g., two potential apartment rentals), they later
showed a choice-supportive bias in their memory attributions (Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather,
Shafir, & Johnson, 2000, 2003). That is, they were more likely to attribute positive features
(e.g., “sunny and bright”) to the option they chose and attribute negative features (e.g., “small
bedroom”) to the option they rejected. This bias in favoring the chosen option in memory occurs
not only when people make the choice themselves but also when a choice is made on their behalf
that they are led to believe is in their best interest (Benney & Henkel, 2006). However, people
do not show choice-supportive biases when choices are made randomly for them (Benney &

Memory attributions 5
Henkel, 2006; Mather et al., 2003).
Thus far research has provided important information about the circumstances under
which choice-supportive biases in memory are more or less likely to occur. The findings from
these studies showing that choice-supportive biases in memory occur when people make their
choices purposefully but not when choices are made randomly suggest that the biases may be the
result of people’s belief that the option they chose is better. However, other factors may have led
to the memory attributions favoring the chosen option over the nonchosen option, such as
selective encoding due to information search processes biased in favor of a preferred alternative
(Brownstein, 2003) or dissonance reduction immediately after the choice (Festinger, 1957). To
better understand the role that beliefs play in memory attributions about past choices, the present
studies examine instances when people have an incorrect belief about what their previous choice
was. By placing beliefs about choices and the actual choice in opposition, we can isolate the
effects of belief on memory for choices from other factors.
In addition, in the second experiment, we examined the role of beliefs on the vividness
and qualitative characteristics of the memories. Although previous studies have examined how
qualitative characteristics of false memories differ from characteristics of accurate memories
(e.g., Arbuthnott, Geelen, & Kealy, 2002; Bredart, Lampinen, & Defeldre, 2003; Heaps & Nash,
2001; Hoffman, Garcia-Palacios, Thomas, & Schmidt, 2001; Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001;
Kealy & Arbuthnott, 2003; Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997; Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, &
Toglia, 2001; Norman & Schacter, 1997), researchers have not investigated how beliefs about
how desirable the memory is might influence its vividness. When remembering features from
past choice options, positive features of chosen options and negative features of rejected options
should be more satisfying to remember than non choice-supportive features. An interesting
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question is whether the desirability of a particular memory might influence how vivid it feels.
Participants in the present studies were given several descriptions of pairs of options
(e.g., two potential cars, two potential roommates) and asked to choose one of the two options
within each pair. All options had both positive and negative features. Later, participants were
asked to remember which features had been associated with a given option. Prior studies have
found that participants sometimes misremember which of the two options they had originally
chosen (e.g., Mather & Johnson, 2000). To maximize the possibility of this occurring,
participants in the present studies completed the feature attribution memory task 2 days after
having made their choices in Experiment 1 and 1 week later in Experiment 2. If beliefs at the
time of retrieval about the chosen option do indeed have an impact on memory attributions, then
people’s attributions should favor the option that they believe they chose – whether their belief is
correct (they really did choose that option) or incorrect (they are misremembering which option
they chose). Thus for both correctly remembered choices and incorrectly remembered choices,
people should attribute relatively more positive features to the option they believe they chose,
and more negative features to the option they believe they rejected.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Eighty undergraduates participated for partial course credit (65 women and
15 men). Ages ranged from 18 to 24 years old (M = 21.8, SD = 6.6). Three additional
participants did not return for the second session and two other participants did not indicate
which options they had chosen. Data from these participants were not included in the analyses.
Materials. We used five choice scenarios that each included two options. These were
choices between roommates, summer internships, apartments, cars, and potential dating partners
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(for an example, see the car choice in Table 1). There were 10-12 features listed for each of the
two options in a scenario. Each option included both positive and negative features, the valence
of which was established through prior norms. An equal number of positive features were
randomly assigned to each of the two options in a scenario, and an equal number of negative
features were as well. Thus within a given scenario, both options had the same number of
positive features and the same number of negative features. For each scenario, there was a
separate memory test consisting of a randomly ordered list of the items from each option
intermixed with three to five positive and three to five negative new features.
Procedure. Participants were asked to read through each choice scenario at their own
rate and select one of the two options by circling it. Instructions emphasized that they should
take their time and carefully make their choice for each scenario. Each scenario was presented
one at a time, and after participants made their choice, the next scenario was presented. The five
scenarios were presented in a randomized order to each participant. They returned 2 days later to
complete the surprise memory tests in which they were asked to indicate which option they had
originally chosen and which option each feature had been associated with, or whether it was
new. Thus for each feature, they were to chose from three alternatives: option A, option B, or
new. The order of the memory tests was randomly determined for each participant.
Results
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical analyses and partial eta squared values
(p2) are reported to indicate effect sizes. All t tests were two-tailed.
Memory accuracy. The proportion of studied items called old (“hits”), the proportion of
new items called old (“false alarms”), and the proportion of hits correctly attributed to their
original option are presented in Table 2 separately for scenarios with correctly remembered
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choices and misremembered choices. All participants correctly remembered at least some of
their choices, and 50 participants were wrong about which option they chose for at least one
choice. Of these 50, 32 incorrectly remembered one choice, 15 incorrectly remembered two
choices, 1 incorrectly remembered three choices, 2 incorrectly remembered 4 choices, and 0
incorrectly remembered all 5 choices. The number of individuals who incorrectly remembered
their choice for a given scenario ranged from 11 (14%) to 21 (26%).
Individual t tests were conducted to compare memory performance for positive versus
negative features for each of the 6 dimensions in Table 2. In general, participants were more
accurate at remembering negative features than positive features (as in Mather & Johnson, 2000;
but see also Mather, Knight, & McCaffrey, 2005, Experiment 3), and this was true for both old
and new features (thus a “mirror effect’ was shown, Glanzer & Adams, 1985). Specifically,
participants both recognized and identified the source of negative features more accurately than
positive features (Rows 1, 3, and 4 of Table 2) and made fewer false alarms for negative than for
positive features (Rows 2 and 5), with all 5 t tests yielding p < .005. The only exception to this
pattern of better memory for negative features than for positive features was the nonsignificant
difference in participants’ source identification accuracy when they misremembered which
option was chosen (Row 6), t(49) < 1.
When comparing correctly remembered and misremembered choices for those 50
participants who had at least one of both, there were no significant differences in hit or false
alarm rates (both F<1), but participants’ source accuracy was significantly better when they
correctly remembered which option they had chosen (M = .63, SE = .01) than when they
misremembered which option they had chosen (M = .56, SE = .02), F(1, 49) = 9.30, MSE = .03,
p<.01, p2=.16.
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Choice-supportive memory attributions. Of primary interest was the extent to which
participants made attributions of positive and negative features to the chosen or rejected options.
Source attributions were calculated in two different ways to assess this. The first set of analyses
use a dependent measure typically used in many studies of source monitoring (see Henkel &
Franklin, 1998). This is based on the proportion of studied features correctly attributed to the
chosen or rejected option, given that the features were correctly recognized as old. The second
set of analyses use a dependent measure known as an asymmetry score that was developed
specifically to examine choice-supportive memory attributions. Asymmetry scores were
calculated using the method outlined by Mather et al. (2000) in order to reveal whether
participants’ memory attributions favored their chosen options or not (i.e., whether they assigned
relatively more positive features to the chosen option and more negative features to the rejected
option).1 This particular measure is useful because it provides a composite score indicating the
extent to which participants made attributions favoring the chosen or nonchosen option, thus
allowing direct comparisons across conditions of the degree of choice-supportiveness. In
addition, this measure controls for spurious effects that may be due to unequal numbers of
participants having selected one option over another when making their initial choice.2 Positive
scores indicate attributions favoring the chosen option, and negative scores indicate attributions
favoring the nonchosen option, with scores of zero showing a bias toward neither option.
Figure 1 presents the proportion of features attributed to the option remembered as
chosen or rejected as a function of feature valence. The top left panel shows source attribution
accuracy rates when participants correctly remembered which option was chosen, and the top
right panel shows attributions when participants incorrectly remembered which option was
chosen. A 2 (feature valence: positive, negative) x 2 (option attributed to: remembered as
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chosen, remembered as rejected) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for the scenarios in
which participants correctly remembered which option they chose, and a significant feature
valence x option-attributed-to interaction was found, F(1, 79) = 25.74, p < .001, p2=.25. As
predicted, participants attributed more positive features to the chosen option than to the rejected
option, t(79) = 6.32, p < .001. They attributed slightly though not significantly more negative
features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(79) = 1.62, p = .10.
A separate 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted for the cases in which participants
incorrectly remembered which option they chose, and again, a significant feature valence x
option-attributed-to interaction was found, F(1, 49) = 103.71, p < .002, p2=.18. Here,
participants attributed significantly more positive features to the option they believed they chose
than to the option they actually chose, t(49) = 29.92, p < .005, and they attributed more negative
features to the option they believed they rejected than to the option they actually rejected, t(49) =
2.27, p < .03.
Separate analyses were conducted for correctly remembered choices and for incorrectly
remembered choices because not all participants incorrectly remembered a choice. Direct
comparisons of attributions for correctly remembered choices and incorrectly remembered
choices can be made only for the 50 participants who incorrectly remembered at least one of
their choices. The direct comparison also revealed a significant feature valence x optionattributed-to interaction, F(1, 49) = 17.08, p < .001, p2=.26, but no significant interaction
between choice accuracy, feature valence, and option-attributed-to, F(1, 49) = 1.43, p = .24.
Thus participants’ attributions were choice-supportive both for options that they correctly
remembered and for options that they incorrectly remembered.
Choice-supportive attribution biases can also be examined for new items erroneously
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claimed as belonging to the chosen or rejected option. The proportion of positive and negative
new items attributed to the option remembered as chosen or rejected was therefore examined
both for scenarios in which participants correctly remembered their choices and for scenarios in
which they incorrectly remembered their choices. These data are presented in the bottom panel
of Figure 1. As in the analyses for studied items, a 2 x 2 ANOVA indicated a significant feature
valence x option-attributed-to interaction for correctly remembered choices, F(1, 79) = 18.42, p
< .001, p2=.19. When participants correctly remembered which option was chosen, they
attributed more positive features to the chosen option than to the rejected option, t(79) = 2.40, p
< .01, and more negative features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(79) = 4.00, p
< .001. Likewise, a significant feature valence x option-attributed-to interaction was found for
incorrectly remembered choices, F(1, 49) = 7.14, p < .01, p2=.13. When participants
misremembered which option was chosen, they attributed more positive features to the option
they believed they chose than to the option they believed they rejected, t(49) = 2.51, p < .01, and
slightly though not significantly more negative features to the option they believed they rejected
than to option they believed they chose, t(49) = 1.51, p = .14. An additional analysis using only
the subset of participants who misremembered at least one of their choices and correctly
remembered the others showed a significant valence x option-attributed-to interaction as well,
F(1, 49) = 17.39, p < .001, p2=.26, with no significant interaction between choice accuracy,
feature valence, and option-attributed-to F(1, 49) = 0.14, p = .71. Thus participants’ attributions
of new items were choice-supportive both for options that they correctly remembered and for
options that they incorrectly remembered.
Analyses were also conducted based on asymmetry scores for both correctly and
incorrectly remembered choices, and the results of these analyses are consistent with the results
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of analyses based on conditionalized proportions. For the choices in which participants
correctly remembered which option they had selected, asymmetry scores were significantly
greater than zero, M = .28, SE =.06, t(79) = 4.63, p < .001, and thus revealed a bias favoring
chosen options. For the choices in which participants incorrectly remembered which option they
chose, participants significantly favored the options they thought they chose, rather than the ones
they actually chose (with positive scores indicating a bias in favor of remembered choices and
against the actual choices), M = .56, SE = .15, t(49) = 3.80, p <. 001. Among the 50 participants
who misremembered which option they had chosen for at least one scenario and correctly
remembered which option they had chosen for other scenarios, there was no significant
difference in how choice supportive they were for the correctly (M = .28, SE = .09) and
incorrectly remembered choices (M = .56, SE = .15), t(49) = 1.67, p =.10. Shown in the top
panel of Table 3 are the mean choice-supportive asymmetry scores for these 50 participants
separately for correct and incorrect attributions of old features as well as for incorrect attributions
of new features. A 2 (Belief about which option was chosen: Correct, Incorrect) x 3 (Attribution
type: Correct Old Feature, Incorrect Old Feature, Incorrect New Feature) ANOVA revealed no
significant effects (all ps > .10). Thus, participants had similar choice-supportive biases in their
attributions for both old and new features.
Discussion
The present study assessed the impact of belief about choices on people’s attribution of
positive and negative features to the options they believe they chose and the options they believe
they rejected. To create a situation where people would misremember some of their choices, a 2day delay between having made the choices and assessment of memory was used. Recognition
accuracy was reasonably high (the average hit rate was about 86%), even with this long retention
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interval, and did not vary whether participants correctly or incorrectly remembered the chosen
option. Overall source identification accuracy was modest, especially when participants
misremembered which option was chosen. However, the absolute rates of source accuracy are a
function of the very phenomenon under investigation. That is, when participants misremember
an option, we argue that their source attributions will be a function of which option they believe
they chose rather than which option they actually chose.
The findings from Experiment 1 indicate that people’s memory attributions favor the
option they believe they chose over the option they believe they rejected, even when they
incorrectly remember which option was in fact chosen. This illustrates the strong impact belief at
the time of retrieval can have on one’s memory. Whereas prior studies have shown that beliefs
are an important component of reconstructive memory processes in general (e.g., Cook et al.,
2003; Mather & Johnson, 2003; Mather et al., 1999), the role that beliefs play in memory
attributions about past choices has not been addressed and was thus the primary focus of the
present study.
The fact that choice-supportive biases favoring the option believed to have been chosen
over the option believed to have been rejected were found not only for features that were part of
the original scenarios but also for new features that were not presented at all is important to note
because it indicates that the bias cannot be accounted for solely by selective encoding. While
deciding which option to choose, participants may simply pay more attention to the positive
features that draw them to the option they wind up choosing or to the negative features that lead
them to reject the other option. However, if this were the sole factor driving the later memory
attributions, then attributions should be choice supportive for originally studied features but not
for new features.
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The two different measures of source attributions used here allow further confidence in
the conclusion that one’s beliefs about a choice can influence what one remembers about the
chosen and rejected options. Because the proportion measure that was used was conditionalized
on correct recognition, the choice-supportive patterns obtained cannot simply be the byproduct
of differential hit rates. Furthermore, although people tended to better remember negative rather
than positive features overall (both in terms of their hit rates and their source attributions), they
nonetheless showed different patterns of attributions for negative features depending on what
option they believe they chose, and different patterns of attributions for negative over positive
features depending on their beliefs about what option was chosen. In addition, the analyses using
asymmetry scores also yielded patterns of choice-supportive attributions, based on a dependent
measure that is not affected by spurious effects that may arise due to unequal numbers of
participants selecting one option over the other in a given scenario. Taken together, these
findings support the argument that beliefs – both correct and incorrect – about which option was
chosen give rise to memory attributions that favor the option remembered as chosen over the
option remembered as rejected.
However, because participant’s beliefs about which options were chosen and which
options were rejected were not directly manipulated, the results from the present study do not
rule out the possibility that differences in the features best remembered can contribute to the bias
shown. It may be that a choice-supportive bias in memory attributions is not directly the result
of a belief about choice per se. Instead, people’s belief about which option they chose and the
choice-supportive attributions they make may both be the outcome of which features are
remembered best. Specifically, if negative features from Option A are recalled most vividly,
participants may both tend to believe they rejected that option (and chose the other option) and to

Memory attributions 15
attribute positive features to the option they believe they chose and negative features to the
option they believe they rejected. If this were the case, beliefs about the choice itself would not
play a critical role. Experiment 2 was thus designed to better understand the way in which beliefs
about past choices shape one’s memories and attributions made about those memories.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we misled participants about which option they had chosen for some
choices to more stringently test the role of belief about choices in choice-supportive memory
biases. We gave participants a series of choices and then brought them back for memory tests 1
week later. At that point, we “reminded” them of which option they had chosen for each choice.
For each participant, we misinformed them about two choices and correctly informed them about
two choices. If the belief that whichever option one chose was the better option is the critical
factor underlying choice-supportive memory, choice-supportive biases should be just as strong in
the misleading-reminder condition as in the correct-reminder condition.
This study also provided us with the opportunity to examine how beliefs about sources
might influence the qualitative characteristics of the memories attributed to those sources. In
particular, we were interested in whether features attributed in a belief-consistent manner would
seem more vivid than features that do not fit as well with one’s expectations. Previous studies
examining the qualitative characteristics of memories have typically focused on how the
characteristics differ depending on the source or nature of the memory. For example,
participants who hear a list of words that are all semantically related to a lure word and later
incorrectly remember hearing the lure word give lower ratings of perceptual detail for the lure
words than for the correctly remembered words (Mather et al., 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997).
Along the same lines, previous studies have found that, in comparison to neutral memories,

Memory attributions 16
emotional memories tend to be remembered more vividly and be given higher ratings for their
qualitative characteristics (Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004).
However, previous research has not examined how beliefs at the time of retrieval about
the source of the attributed information might affect how vividly it is remembered.
By manipulating participants’ beliefs about the sources at retrieval, in this study we evaluated
whether the subjective qualities of memory are also subject to the same reconstructive processes
as other aspects of episodic memory.
Method
Participants. Sixty-one undergraduates (46 women, 15 men) participated for course
credit. Ages ranged from 17 to 21 (M = 18.7, SD = 1.0). An additional 6 participants did not
return for the second session, and 1 participant did not follow instructions on the memory test
and so that person’s results were not included in the analyses.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1
except that participants returned 1 week later rather than 2 days later for the second session, and
on the memory tests, we asked participants not only to indicate which option each feature had
been associated with, or whether it was new, but we also asked them to rate their confidence that
the feature was associated with the option they attributed it to. In addition, we asked them to
rate: (a) how clearly they remembered their feelings and emotional reactions about the feature
when they first made the choice; (b) how clearly they remembered any other non-emotional
thoughts about this feature or associations to it when they first made the choice; and (c) overall,
how vividly and clearly they remembered the feature or details about it. Each of these ratings
was made on a 1-5 scale ranging from not at all clear to very clear. Participants were asked not
to give these ratings for features they said were new.
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At the top of the memory questionnaire for each choice scenario, we listed the two choice
options, with one of them circled ahead of time by the experimenter. We told participants that
the option they selected last week was the one that was circled. The first scenario tested was
always the car choice, and the option participants had actually chosen was correctly circled for
this one. This served as a filler scenario to help establish the legitimacy of our reminders and
was not included in the data analyses. Participants were given correct reminders about the
choices they had made for two of the other four scenarios and misinformed about the other two
scenarios. Which two scenarios had misleading reminders were counterbalanced across
participants and the four scenarios were presented in random order.
A final questionnaire served as a manipulation check for the deception about the chosen
options. For each scenario, the same option was circled as on the source attribution test and
participants were instructed to list two reasons they chose it, if they could remember. In
addition, for each scenario, they rated how well they remembered choosing that option (where 1
= do not remember … 5 = very clearly remember).
Results
Manipulation checks. On the final questionnaire, 4 participants said they thought they
had chosen a different option for at least one of the misleading-reminder scenarios. In addition,
another 9 participants left the “reasons why I picked this option” question blank for at least one
of the misleading-reminder options. As most (7) of these participants left the reasons fields
blank for all five scenarios, this was probably an indication of forgetting or laziness rather than
disbelief about having chosen a particular option. However, to be conservative, in the
subsequent analyses we only included the 48 participants who provided us with reasons why they
had chosen each of the misleading-reminder options and who did not express any doubts about
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having chosen those options.
When asked how clearly they remembered choosing each option, the average rating was
between a 3 (“somewhat remember choosing that [car/roommate, etc.]”) and a 4 (“fairly clearly
remember choosing that [car/roommate, etc.]”) on the 5-point scale, with no significant
difference between ratings for the two misleading-reminder choices (M = 3.34, SE = .11) and the
two correct-reminder choices (M = 3.52, SE = .12), t(47) = 1.53, p = .13. Thus, we appear to
have been successful at convincing these participants that they chose the options we indicated
they had chosen.
Memory accuracy. Hits, false alarms, and source attribution scores were calculated the
same way as in Experiment 1 (see Table 4 for means). As in Experiment 1, memory tended to be
better for negative features than positive features, but the difference was not as pronounced, with
significant effects only seen for false alarms in the correct-reminder condition, t(47) = 2.02, p
<.05, and the misleading-reminder condition, t(47) = 3.25, p <.01 (Rows 2 and 4 in Table 5).
Comparisons of the correct-reminder and misleading-reminder conditions showed similar
hit rates for the two conditions for both positive and negative features (all ts1), but source
identification accuracy was higher in the correct-reminder condition than the incorrect-reminder
condition for both positive features, t(47) = 4.12, p < .001, and negative features, t(47) = 4.16, p
< .001. Thus, misleading participants about which option they had chosen did not affect their
recognition accuracy, but did impair their source accuracy.
Choice-supportive memory attributions. Attributions of positive and negative features to
the chosen or rejected options were examined in the same manner as in Experiment 1. The top
panel of Figure 2 presents the proportion of features attributed to the option remembered as
chosen or rejected as a function of feature valence and type of reminder about the chosen option.
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A 2 (feature valence: positive, negative) x 2 (option attributed to: told was chosen, told was
rejected) x 2 (reminder: correct, misleading) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted, and a
significant feature valence x option-attributed-to interaction was found, F(1, 47) = 38.98, p <
.001, p2=.45, without a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 47) = 0.81, p = .37. As predicted,
when participants were given a correct reminder about their choice, they attributed more positive
features to the chosen option than to the rejected option, t(47) = 7.44, p < .001, though they did
not attribute more negative features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(47) < 1.
When participants were incorrectly informed as to which option they had chosen, they attributed
significantly more positive features to the option they were led to believe they chose than to the
option they actually chose, t(47) = 7.44, p < .001, though they attributed only slightly but not
significantly more negative features to the option they believe they rejected than to the option
they actually rejected, t(47) = 1.63, p = .11.
False alarms to new items were also examined to determine whether people made
attributions of new items in a manner that favored the chosen over the rejected option. These
data are presented in the bottom panel of Figure 2. As in the analyses for studied items, a 2 x 2 x
2 ANOVA showed a significant feature valence x option-attributed-to interaction, F(1, 47) =
23.01, p < .001, p2=.33, and no significant three-way interaction F(1, 47) = 0.02, p = .96. When
participants were given correct reminders as to which option was chosen, they attributed more
positive features to the chosen option than to the rejected option, t(47) = 2.44, p < .02, and more
negative features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(47) = 2.61, p < .01.
Likewise, when participants were given incorrect reminders as to which option was chosen, they
attributed more positive features to the option they believed they chose than to the option they
believed they rejected, t(47) = 2.88, p < .01, and more negative features to the option they
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believed they rejected than to option they believed they chose, t(47) = 2.61, p < .01.
Asymmetry scores were computed using the same method as in Experiment 1 to further
examine whether participants’ memory attributions favored the apparently chosen options (those
circled by us) or not. Participants’ overall asymmetry scores were significantly greater than zero
and thus revealed a bias favoring apparently-chosen options for both the correct-reminder
scenarios (M = .47, SE = .08, t[47] = 5.56, p < .001) and the misleading-reminder scenarios (M =
.50, SE = .11, t[47] = 4.62, p < .001). Indeed, there was no significant difference between the
conditions, t(47) = .28, indicating that participants were just as choice-supportive for options
they had actually rejected but that we told them they had chosen as they were for the options for
which our reminders were accurate. A follow-up analysis computing asymmetry scores
separately for correctly attributed old features, misattributed old features, and misattributed new
features revealed significant choice-supportive asymmetry scores for each of these types of
attributions, with no significant differences by type of attribution or condition (see the lower
panel of Table 3 for means; all p > .5).
Memorial features. For analysis of the various subjective memorial characteristics
(emotions, other thoughts, overall vividness), we coded each attribution of a feature to an option
as choice-supportive or not choice-supportive, depending on whether the feature was positive or
negative and the option was chosen or rejected (based on the options we told participants they
had chosen, rather than on their actual choices). Separate 2 (attribution: choice-supportive or not)
x 2 (reminder: correct or misleading) x 2 (feature valence: positive, negative) ANOVAs for each
characteristic revealed that for each type of subjective rating, features attributed in a choicesupportive fashion (positive features attributed to apparently chosen options and negative
features to apparently rejected options) were rated more highly than features attributed in a non
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choice-supportive fashion (p < .05 for all ratings; p2=.08, .17, .19, .21 for confidence, emotions,
thoughts, and vividness, respectively; see Figure 3). There were no significant effects of the type
of reminder or significant interactions of type of reminder and attribution. Thus, participants
rated the features they attributed in a choice-supportive fashion as being more vividly
remembered, even when the “chosen option” was actually the option they had rejected.
An interesting question is whether this inflation of the memorial characteristics of
features attributed in a choice-supportive way occurred for the new features. Not everyone
falsely attributed new features to both chosen and rejected options, but among the 45 participants
who did, new features attributed in a choice-supportive way were given higher average
qualitative characteristic ratings (M = 3.02, SE = .10) than new features attributed in a non
choice-supportive way (M = 2.77, SE = .13), t(44) = 2.05, p < .05. This finding that a vividness
inflation effect occurred for new features never seen before indicates that biases at the time of
retrieval must help create the effect.
Discussion
These findings further indicate that belief influences memory attributions for past choice
options. When participants are lead to believe that they chose a particular option, they remember
relatively more positive attributes having been associated with the chosen option and more
negative attributes with the rejected option. These findings thus conceptually replicate and
extend those from Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, participants’ beliefs about their choices were
examined by comparing memory attributions when they correctly remembered which option they
had chosen to their attributions when they misremembered which option they had chosen. By
directly manipulating people’s beliefs about their choices by providing them with correct or
misleading reminders as to which option they had originally chosen in Experiment 2, we were

Memory attributions 22
able to isolate the choice-supportive memory attribution biases seen to the beliefs held about
their choice at retrieval. Differences in memorability of features cannot alone account for these
findings.
The fact that relatively few participants questioned the misleading information they were
given when they were told which of the options they had selected 1 week prior extends recent
findings of “choice blindness” (Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, & Olsson, 2005). Participants asked
to indicate which of two faces was most attractive and then handed one of the pictures and asked
to describe their reasons for their choice rarely noticed when the experimenter surreptitiously
swapped the pictures. The participants gave reasons for choosing the face they had not chosen,
just as our participants gave reasons for the choice we said they had made. Furthermore, in our
study, when asked how clearly they remembered choosing each option, the average rating was
between “somewhat” and “fairly clearly” remember choosing that option, and the subjective
vividness of the memory for the choice was not significantly greater when they were asked about
the choice they had really made than when they were misled about which choice they had made.
Thus people’s subjective experience was that they were in fact remembering their choice from
Session 1, even when they were misremembering it.
It is important to put these findings in the context of overall rates of memory
performance. Even with the 1-week retention interval used in the present experiment, people’s
overall recognition of the attributes was reasonably good (~80%). Thus it is not simply the case
that people have little memory for the choices and their associated features and are simply
guessing on the memory attribution test. The fact that they show similar patterns of source
attributions for old items as well as for new items indicates that their attributions are guided by
their belief as to which option was chosen. Although overall source attribution rates were low,
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this may be precisely the circumstance under which people are more likely to rely on beliefs
about their chosen option to reconstruct their memory for the associated features. These
reconstructive processes no doubt are a combination of actual memory experiences as well as
processes such as guessing and reasoning (this issue is discussed further in the general
discussion).
Related to this point is the finding of greater source monitoring accuracy for scenarios in
which correct reminders about choices were given than when misleading reminders were given,
which is congruent with the finding in Experiment 1 of greater source monitoring accuracy when
people correctly remember which option they chose than when they misremember. This finding
suggests that beliefs help support accurate source attributions as well as influence inaccurate
attributions. For instance, having made a choice between two cars, people may correctly
remember that “the option I chose had the comfortable seats.” If their belief about which option
they chose is correct, they will have higher source attribution accuracy than if their belief about
which option they chose is incorrect.
By deceiving participants at retrieval about which option they had chosen, we were also
able to examine the effects of beliefs about sources on the qualitative characteristics of the
features attributed to them. For the confidence rating, we asked participants how confident they
were that the feature had been associated with that option. But the other ratings of qualitative
characteristics were focused on the feature itself rather than on source memory (e.g., “How
vividly and clearly do you remember this feature or details about it?”) Results indicated that
participants were not only more confident about the source of features attributed in a choicesupportive way, but also felt they remembered them more clearly than the features attributed in a
non choice-supportive way. This vividness inflation occurred both when they were misled about
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which option they had chosen and when they were provided with correct reminders. In addition,
the vividness inflation also occurred for the new features that were falsely attributed to one of the
two options. Thus, this study suggests that features that support one’s beliefs in terms of what
they are associated with feel more vivid at the time of retrieval.
General Discussion
When remembering the features of past choice options, people have a choice-supportive
bias in the way that they attribute these features (Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2000,
2003). Previous studies reveal circumstances under which choice-supportive biases are more
likely to be shown. For instance, younger adults show more choice-supportive biases when
induced to think about their emotions about the choice (Mather & Johnson, 2000). People do not
show choice-supportive biases when a computer randomly selects the chosen option (Benney &
Henkel, 2006).
This latter research is consistent with the idea that beliefs about the chosen option may
play a critical role, because choice-supportive biases are found when people are likely to believe
that the option chosen was superior but not when they are unlikely to have that belief (e.g., when
the choice is randomly made). However, the cause of the bias was not clear from these previous
studies, as the process of making a choice provides many opportunities for bias (e.g., Mather et
al., 2005). Selective attention at the time of encoding may make choice-supportive features more
memorable later (Brownstein, 2003; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Additionally,
faced with cognitive dissonance about the positive features of the rejected option and the
negative features of the chosen option, people may distort their memories immediately after
making a choice in order to resolve their psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994;
Festinger, 1957). The present studies investigate whether the belief at the time of retrieval that
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one chose Roommate A and rejected Roommate B is in itself enough to create a choicesupportive memory bias, even if which roommate is believed to have been the chosen one is
erroneously remembered by the person or is randomly determined by the experimenter.
Our results support the notion that beliefs at the time of retrieval are sufficient to create
choice-supportive memory. In Experiment 1 we examined instances in which people
spontaneously misremember which of the options they chose. In these cases, people showed
memory biases favoring their believed choices rather than their actual choices. In Experiment 2,
we manipulated people’s beliefs by misinforming them about which option they selected earlier.
Participants had choice-supportive biases in memory for whichever option we told them they had
chosen, whether or not they had actually chosen it. In addition, we found that when feature
attributions favored the believed choice, those features were rated as being remembered more
vividly with more associated phenomenal characteristics than when the feature attributions
favored the other option. This finding that beliefs about what option was chosen and what option
was rejected plays a critical role in memory reconstruction adds to our current understanding of
choice-supportive memory bias by providing insights into a critical cause of the phenomenon.
One question we have received in response to these findings is how much they reflect
“real” memory processes versus nonmemorial judgment processes involving guessing or
reasoning. From the perspective of the source-monitoring framework, this is a false dichotomy,
as memory is inextricably intertwined with judgment processes (Johnson et al., 1993). In order
to interpret a currently activated mental representation (e.g., the statement “high mileage on
odometer”) as corresponding with a past event rather than just a new perception or thought,
heuristic and systematic judgment processes must indicate that the qualitative features of the
mental activation meet the criteria for a match with some source, such as one of the cars
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previously read about. Thus a currently activated mental representation is experienced as “a
memory,” even when it is based on misinformation (here, about the option that was chosen).
Findings from Experiment 2 are consistent with this view. Very few participants caught onto the
deceptive nature of the reminders we provided about their choices, and almost all were willing to
provide reasons why they made their choice (see also Johansson et al., 2005). They reported
moderate to high levels of confidence and vividness for the choices that they misremembered as
well as for the choices they correctly remembered. Thus their subjective experience was that
they were remembering in both cases. The present findings as well as numerous other studies
attest to the fact that people’s subjective experience of remembering can be quite erroneous (e.g.,
when people claim to “remember” having heard words on a list that were never presented,
Mather et al., 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Furthermore,
overall recognition rates illustrate that people’s general sense for what did and did not occur in
the present study was reasonably intact. While source attribution accuracy rates were modest at
best in the current studies, it is likely the case that that is precisely the circumstance under which
beliefs are more likely to guide memory reconstruction, as is found in studies examining
situations in which people are more likely to rely on schemas to guide their remembering (e.g.,
Mather & Johnson, 2003; Mather et al., 1999; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). Future research can
more closely examine whether decisions that are more meaningful and important are less likely
to be impacted by beliefs and reconstructive memory biases, though certainly studies have
suggested that even in many complex and meaningful everyday experiences, biases in memory
can occur, such as when people remember their high school and test grades as higher then they
actually were (Bahrick, Hall, & Berger, 1996), women remember their pregnancy and childbirth
experiences as more positive than they had documented at the time in their journals (Smith,
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1994), and older adults remember their past health and well-being as better than they originally
reported (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004).
According to the source monitoring framework, both the qualitative features of activated
information and general knowledge influence source judgments (Johnson et al., 1993). Our
findings not only demonstrate that beliefs about which option was chosen play a significant role
in reconstructing memories of past choices, but that beliefs can influence the qualitative
characteristics that comprise the subjective experience of remembering as well. This finding that
manipulating people’s beliefs influences the vividness of their memories has both practical and
theoretical implications. Consider, for example, this finding in the context of social persuasion:
Tactics that manipulate a consumer’s beliefs about whether they previously chose an option can
potentially alter the person’s recollection and the vividness of the features comprising their
memory. From a theoretical standpoint, models of memory must consider the complex interplay
between mental representation and beliefs. Previous studies have examined qualitative
characteristics to shed light on how various types of memories differ and how the nature of the
qualitative features help determine source attributions (e.g., Comblain, D'Argembeau, & Van der
Linden, 2005; Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1990; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988;
Mather et al., 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Talarico et al.,
2004). The present findings indicate that the qualitative features of memories not only serve as
input for source judgment processes, but that they are also likely to be influenced by one’s
beliefs at the time of retrieval. The interactive nature of the memorial characteristics and general
knowledge about the situation may help make belief-consistent memory distortion seem more
vivid and realistic than belief-inconsistent errors in source monitoring.
In conclusion, the present studies demonstrate the important role that beliefs play in
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reconstructing memories about past choices. The malleability of beliefs and memory attributions
based on those beliefs observed here, although troubling perhaps in some regards as to how
erroneous people’s memories can be, are likely the byproducts of a cognitive system that
generally is efficient at compensating for memories that become impoverished over time. In
addition, it may well be the case that by having a memory system that is guided at times by our
current beliefs, people are able to maintain a greater sense of satisfaction and well being with the
choices they have made in their lives.
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Footnotes
1

The asymmetry score calculation performed for each person on each choice scenario is outlined

below (for more detail and discussion, see Mather et al., 2000). The extent to which the person’s
memory attributions favored an option (call it option A) was computed by subtracting the
proportion of attributions favoring the competing option (option B) from those favoring A
(positive features attributed to Option A and negative features attributed to Option B both favor
Option A). The resulting sums were then converted to z-scores such that the mean value across
all participants was zero. Relative to the mean, a positive value indicates that the person's
attributions favor option A, whereas a negative value indicates favoring of option B. This score
was left intact for those who chose option A (thus capturing the extent to which they favored
their chosen option), whereas for people who chose option B, the score was multiplied by -1.
This formula was repeated for separate subcomponents, such as just the features correctly
attributed and just the new features incorrectly attributed to an option.
2

In Experiment 1, the ratios of people choosing one option over another for each of the five

scenarios ranged from a relatively even split or a slight favoring of one option (50:50, 61:39) to a
stronger preference for one of the options (67:33, 78:22, 81:19). Similarly in Experiment 2, there
were scenarios where the preference was not very pronounced (51:49, 54:46, 56:44) and
scenarios with a more strongly preferred option (71:39, 74:26), one of which was the car
scenario which was not included with the data analyses because it was a filler scenario.

Table 1
Car Scenario Choice Options (Valence of Features was not Indicated for Participants)

Option 1: Red car (5+, 5-)
- Hard to find service outlets
- Has a dent from a previous accident
+ Seats are very comfortable
+ Good handling on turns
- High mileage on odometer
- Makes an unidentified rattling sound
+ Prestigious model
+ Air conditioning included
- Doesn’t do well in bad weather
+ Stereo included

Option 2: Black car (5+, 5-)
- No warranty
- Some rust on exterior
+ High resale value
+ Has airbags
- Needs a few repairs
- Not much trunk space
+ Powerful engine
+ Previous owner took good care of car
- Not fuel efficient
+ Has a sun roof

Table 2
Hits, False Alarms, and Source Identification Accuracy for Positive and Negative Features in
Experiment 1 (SEs given in parentheses)
_________________________________________________________________
Proportion Attributed

Feature Valence
Positive

Negative

Mdiff (95% CI)

_________________________________________________________________
Correctly Remembered Which Option Was Chosen (n = 80)
Hits to Studied Items

.82 (.01)

.88 (.01)

-.06 (.02)

False Alarms to New Items

.43 (.02)

.28 (.02)

.15 (.03)

Source Identification Accuracy

.60 (.01)

.68 (.01)

-.08 (.03)

Misremembered Which Option Was Chosen (n = 50)
Hits to Studied Items

.83 (.02)

.90 (.02)

-.08 (.04)

False Alarms to New Items

.47 (.05)

.32 (.04)

.14 (.10)

Source Identification Accuracy

.55 (.03)

.56 (.02)

.01 (.06)

_________________________________________________________________

Table 3
Choice-supportive Asymmetry Scores When Participants Correctly Believe They Chose the Chosen
Option Versus When They Incorrectly Believe They Chose the Rejected Option in Experiments 1 and
2
______________________________________________________________________
Old Features Old Features New Features
Correctly
Incorrectly
Incorrectly
Attributed
Attributed
Attributed
Experiment 1
Correct Belief

.26 (.08)

.18 (.08)

.25 (.09)

Incorrect Belief

.46 (.14)

.50 (.14)

.41 (.14)

Correct Belief

.41 (.08)

.40 (.09)

.36 (.10)

Incorrect Belief

.41 (.11)

.47 (.11)

.42 (.13)

Experiment 2

______________________________________________________________________
Note: Positive scores indicate a bias in favor of the option believed to be the chosen option. Standard
errors are in parentheses.

Table 4
Hits, False Alarms, and Source Identification Accuracy for Positive and Negative Features in
Experiment 2 (SEs given in parentheses)
_________________________________________________________________
Proportion Attributed

Feature Valence
Positive

Negative

Mdiff (95% CI)

_________________________________________________________________
Correct-Reminder Scenarios
Hits to Old Items

.79 (.02)

.82 (.02)

-.03 (.02)

False Alarms to New Items

.37 (.04)

.30 (.03)

.08 (.08)

Source Identification Accuracy

.60 (.02)

.61 (.02)

-.01 (.04)

Hits to Old Items

.79 (.02)

.80 (.02)

-.01 (.03)

False Alarms to New Items

.38 (.03)

.27 (.03)

.11 (.07)

Source Identification Accuracy

.47 (.02)

.48 (.02)

-.01 (.04)

Misleading-Reminder Scenarios

_________________________________________________________________

Figure Captions
Figure 1. Proportion of features attributed to the option believed to be chosen or rejected as a
function of valence of feature in Experiment 1 (error bars represent SE). The top panel represents
attributions for studied features, and the bottom panel represents attributions for new features.
Figure 2. Proportion of features attributed to the option believed to be chosen or rejected as a
function of valence of feature in Experiment 2 (error bars represent SE). The top panel represents
attributions for studied features, and the bottom panel represents attributions for new features.
Figure 3. Memorial characteristic ratings for features from scenarios in Experiment 2 for
which participants’ beliefs about which options they chose were correct (correct reminder compared
with those for which their beliefs were wrong (misleading reminder). Black bars indicate ratings for
features attributed in a choice-supportive (CS) fashion and white bars indicate ratings for features
attributed in a non choice-supportive (NCS) fashion. Error bars indicate the standard error of the
mean.
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